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1. Introduction 
The concept of excluding members of communities and groups to enforce norm 
conformity and cooperation has been evidenced in almost all civilizations and known 
cultures (Gruter and Masters 1986, Williams 2001). Ostracism, the act of excluding, 
has been widely documented and analyzed in many disciplines. Indeed, regulating and 
sanctioning social behavior by ostracizing non-contributing members can be found in 
animals (Goodall 1986, Lancaster 1986), and humans (Wiessner 2005, Kurzban and 
Leary 2001, Williams et al. 2000, Boehm 1999, Mahdi 1986) alike. The term 
ostracism comes from the Greek ostrakismos, a practice originating in Athens as a 
political device instituted, probably by Cleisthenes in 508 B.C., as a constitutional 
safeguard for the Athenian democracy. Athenian citizens would cast a vote by writing 
their preference on ostraca, shards of pottery, to remove for a period of ten years any 
person who threatened the harmony and tranquility of the body politic.  
 
Ostracism has not only been observed in animal groups, primitive cultures and ancient 
civilizations but has also been employed in modern societies for instance with respect 
to strike-breakers or whistle-blowers (See Durkheim 1933, Gordon 1975, Francis 
1985, Williams 2001). There exist many economic contexts, such as team production 
or other dilemma problems, where it is feasible to ostracize individuals when 
monitoring and punishment are decentralized. Gaspart and Seki (2003) for instance 
give an empirical example of a local public good fishery with elements of ostracism.  
 
In light of the ubiquity and pervasiveness of ostracism, the aim of this study is to 
analyze the effectiveness of ostracism as regulatory instrument in a controlled 
strategic environment. More specifically, the objective of this paper is to investigate   3
the effect of exclusion as a punishment device (based on majority voting) on 
contributions in a repeated linear public good game with fixed partners. Theoretical 
research on the voluntary provision of public goods indicates that selfish individuals 
have incentives to free-ride, leading to an inefficient provision under voluntary 
contribution.
1 In contrast to this, people do contribute to public goods both in 
experimental laboratories (e.g. Ledyard, 1995, and Zelmer, 2003) and in real life 
(Ostrom 1990, Gaspart and Seki 2003, Wiessner 2005). Experimental results have, 
however, consistently shown that it is difficult to sustain a high contribution level 
over time (e.g. Isaac and Walker 1988, Andreoni 1988, Croson 1996, and Keser and 
van Winden 2000). As a consequence, several mechanisms aimed at fostering 
cooperation have been explored experimentally. For instance, the availability of costly 
monetary punishment mechanisms increases contribution levels almost to full 
cooperation (see for instance Fehr and Gächter 2000, or Bochet et al. 2005). 
Interestingly, once the cost of punishment is considered, the effect on net earnings is 
neither positive nor significant. One variant of this is non-monetary punishment 
communicated through disapproval. Masclet et al. (2003) found increased 
contribution levels when points indicating disapproval were allocated, but this effect 
did not persist over time.
2 In contrast, Carpenter et al. (2004a, 2004b) found an 
increasing level of contribution in the treatments where participants could signal 
disapproval of the contributions made by others by buying unhappy faces to be 
displayed to the group.  
Kerr (1999) has shown that the threat of ostracism can stimulate cooperation in social 
                                                 
1 See Hirshleifer and Rasmusen (1989) for a theoretical discussion of ostracism as an effective tool for 
promoting cooperation in repeated finite and infinite prisoner’s dilemma games. 
2 See Noussair and Tucker (2005) for an analysis of the effects of combining monetary and non-
monetary sanctions. See also Ostrom et al. (1992) for an early analysis in a common-pool resource 
context. See Apesteguia and Maier-Rigaud (2006) for a discussion of the difference between public 
goods and common-pool resources.    4
dilemmas. Similarly, Kerr et al. (2006) have analyzed the threat of exclusion on the 
relationship between cooperators and defectors based on previous findings that 
defectors have a negative impact on the behavior of other group members, i.e. the 
phenomenon that defectors are like bad apples spoiling the whole barrel.
3 
Cinyabuguma et al. (2005) investigated ostracism based on majority voting in an 
innovative public good experiment, where a lump sum cost was imposed on those 
members voting for ostracism if the member they voted for was excluded during that 
period. The excluded members were then assigned to another public good experiment 
with lower endowment. Their results show an almost maximal level of contribution to 
the public good among non-excluded members. Masclet (2003) designed a multi-
period public good experiment, where each period consisted of two successive public 
good phases, the first relating to production and the second to some social activity. 
After the first phase, each participant could ostracize members for one period (only 
one vote was required for ostracism) from the second phase, i.e. the social activity, 
either at no cost or at some cost depending on the treatment. In both cases 
contribution levels in the first phase increased.  
 
In contrast to Cinyabuguma et al. (2005), where the potential reduction in contributors 
was low since each group consisted of 16 members, we study how the contribution 
levels are affected by introducing “life-time” ostracism in relatively small groups. The 
direct effect of ostracizing a member is that the group size decreases, which 
automatically reduces maximal contribution levels to the public good for all 
remaining periods. Thus, we also study the impact of ostracism on average net 
contribution levels where contributions by ostracized participants are necessarily zero. 
                                                 
3 See also Ouwerkerk et al. (2005).   5
We choose a rather small group size (six members) and thus render ostracism costly 
through the rather substantial loss in potential future contributions. Another 
difference, in line with the field observations cited above indicating that exclusion 
may go as far as threatening the survival of the excluded group member, is that we 
consider that ostracized participants are left only with their endowment. This is in 
contrast to Cinyabuguma et al. (2005) who let the ostracized individuals continue to 
play in another public good game with lower marginal private return. In that sense, 
our experiment renders ostracism costly to both, the group and also to the individual 
that has been excluded.
4  
 
2. Experimental design and procedures 
96 students were recruited from different departments at Bonn University, Germany, 
to participate in the two experimental sessions of a computerized experiment, 
programmed in Z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999). The experiment consists of two 
treatments: (i) a traditional linear public good experiment and (ii) a public good 
experiment with ostracism.
5 Each treatment consisted of ten periods followed by an 
additional ten periods of the other treatment. We control for the order effect by 
running the experiment in both orders. Each session, i.e. ordering of the two 
treatments, involved eight groups with six participants each. Participants were 
randomly assigned to groups and stayed in the same groups throughout the 
experiment.   
 
                                                 
4 From our reading of the psychological literature, allowing the ostracized individual to participate in 
another public good game presumably dilutes the effect of being ostracized and resembles more an opt-
out option than ostracism. 
5 Before each treatment, participants received information about the structure of that treatment only.   6
In each round, participants simultaneously choose how much to contribute to the 
public good out of an endowment of 10 tokens. Participant i’s payoff is calculated 
according to the following function 
 
  πi = 10 - gi + 0.6∑jgj,         ( 1 )  
 
where  g is the contribution to the public good. With such a payoff function, 
individuals have incentives to free-ride, as the marginal private return from 
contribution (0.6) is smaller than the marginal cost (1). The choice of these parameter 
values ensures, irrespective of group size, the social optimum is to invest fully in the 
public good, while the individuals’ optimum is to invest nothing. At the end of each 
period, participants are informed about individual contribution levels and their 
earnings. In the ostracism treatment, there is a second stage in each period, where 
participants either cast a vote for ostracizing another member or refrain from voting 
(note that only one vote per participant was possible). In order to exclude reputation 
effects as much as possible, participants remained anonymous and votes could be cast 
based on contributions in the ongoing period only. Participants were subsequently 
informed about the aggregate number of votes. The minimum number of votes 
required for ostracism was three if the group consisted of five or six members, two if 
the group consisted of three or four members and one when there were only two 
remaining participants. Since the marginal benefit from the public good is set to 0.6, 
and is independent of the size of the group, the decision to ostracize a member always 
reduces the maximum group return by one-sixth. Ostracized participants continued to 
receive 10 tokens for all remaining periods, but were excluded from further decision-
making.    7
3. Results  
Figure 1 depicts the time series of average contributions for the two sessions, 
separated by the type of treatment: public good experiment with and without 
ostracism. Each treatment lasted for 10 periods. We distinguish between gross 
average contribution based only on the non-ostracized participants, and net average 
contribution based on the original group size of six participants to consider the overall 
effect on contribution levels of introducing ostracism.  
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As expected, we find a sharp decline in the average contributions in the traditional 
public good experiment after the initial periods in both sessions. In the ostracism 
treatment, in contrast, the gross average contributions increased to a level above 80% 
of the maximum contribution levels among the remaining participants after the first   8
periods, while the net average contribution is around 70%.
6 Thus, even when 
considering that group size has been reduced because of ostracism, the net average 
contributions are higher than in the traditional public good experiment. In a Wilcoxon 
test we reject equality between the treatments at 1% significance level. Voting 
behavior in the beginning of the ostracism treatment was fairly active with 70% of the 
participants casting a vote in the first period followed by a sharp decline reaching 
22%, in the eighth period, before increasing again as a response to lowered 
contribution levels. In the first period with ostracism, 9 members out of 16 groups 
were ostracized followed by 7 in the second period. During the next six periods, 9 
members were ostracized while the number increased again with 4 members in each 
of the last two periods. Focusing on group averages over all of the periods together, 
rather than on averages in each period, we reject at 1% significance level using a 
Wilcoxon sign test that the average contributions to the public good are the same in 
both ostracism and traditional treatments based on gross earnings. We also reject the 
hypothesis at a weak 7% significance level for net earnings. 
 
Table 1 shows the results of three separate regression analyses of the treatments with 
ostracism. In the first column, we estimate what determines the change in contribution 
from one period to another as a function of the proportion of votes received, the 
others’ average contribution, the absolute positive deviation from others’ average 
contribution and the absolute negative deviation from others’ average contribution, 
where the latter was measured in the previous period. As expected, the proportion of 
votes received from others has a significant and positive effect on the changes in 
                                                 
6 As costs of exclusion are reduced in the last periods, end game effects were observed in all 
treatments.   9
contributions.
7 Then we analyzed what determines the proportion of votes obtained in 
a period as a function of others’ average contribution, absolute positive deviation 
from others’ average contribution and absolute negative deviation from others’ 
average contribution measured in the same period. As expected, negative absolute 
deviations from others’ average contribution significantly increased the proportion of 
votes received. The last regression analyses the circumstances that lead to participants 
being ostracized. The results are similar to the previous regression, i.e. negative 
deviations from others’ average contribution have a significant positive impact on the 
probability of being ostracized.  
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Proportion of votes 
obtained in 
previous period  0.021*  0.006  -  - - - 
Others’ average 
contribution in 
previous  period  -0.482*  0.068  -  - - - 
Absolute positive 
deviation in 
previous  period  -0.604*  0.073  -  - - - 
Absolute negative 
deviation  in 
previous  period  0.305*  0.071  -  - - - 
Others’ average 
contribution  - -  -1.444  1.352  -0.685  0.108 
Absolute positive 
deviation  -  -  0.094  1.502 0.010 0.144 
Absolute negative 
deviation   - -  11.729*  0.972  0.473*  0.624 
Constant 3.376*  0.633  -3.008  12.028  -3.024*  1.056 
Number of 
observations   613    709  709 
Note: * denotes significance at 1% level. The last period in the ostracism treatment is not included in 
the analyses due to end-game effects. Group dummies have been included in the regressions to control 
for group fixed effects, but omitted in the presentation above.  
                                                 
7 The results of a regression using the absolute number of votes and whether or not a vote was received 
in the previous period were similar.    10
4. Conclusion 
In a traditional public good experiment, the average contribution level typically 
declines over time and converges to zero as predicted by standard theory. Despite the 
draconic nature of punishment, contribution levels under ostracism are substantially 
and significantly higher than in the standard public good game. Furthermore and in 
contrast to other costly punishment mechanisms, ostracism has a significant positive 
effect on net earnings. Our results go beyond Cinyabuguma et al. (2005) by 
demonstrating that even in small groups with high costs of ostracism participants are 
willing to ostracize those that contribute the least even if this decreases maximum 
possible earnings. Moreover, these participants were not relocated to another group as 
in Cinyabuguma et al. (2005). As remaining participants step up their contribution 
levels, the total effect of ostracism on net earnings is positive. Not surprisingly, 
however, the cooperation-enhancing effect vanishes as the interaction approaches the 
end, and the potential loss of being ostracized becomes less significant: in that case, 
the temptation of free-riding becomes stronger. This suggests that punishment 
mechanisms based on exclusionary devices are effective in presence of sufficiently 
large, albeit not “infinite”, time horizons. The experimental results corroborate the 
empirical evidence from field studies on the effectiveness of ostracism as a regulatory 
instrument to enforce norm conformity and cooperation in groups. 
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